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6 HUMBOLDT BAYKEEPER and
7 ECOLOGICAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION,
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9 Plaintiffs,

10 No. C 06-02560 JSW

11 v.
12 UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
13 and NORTH COAST RAILROAD
14 AUTHORITY,

15 Defendants.
16 _____/

17 Now before the Court is Defendants' motion for leave to amend their answer. Having
18 considered the parties' papers, relevant legal authority, the record in this case, and having had
19 the benefit of oral argument, the Court hereby denies Defendants' motion.¹

20 **BACKGROUND**

21 Defendants move to amend their answer to change their admission that CUE VI owns
22 the Balloon Track and to plead an affirmative defense of failure to join all necessary and
23 indispensable parties. In essence, Defendants now seek to amend their answer to allege that the
24 State may own part of the property. Plaintiffs oppose on the grounds that they would be
25 prejudiced by the belated amendment, Defendants unduly delayed in seeking leave to amend,
26 Defendants are moving in bad faith, and that the requested amendment would be futile.

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1 The Court HEREBY DENIES Plaintiffs' administrative motion for leave to file a
sur-reply and GRANTS Plaintiffs' administrative motion for leave to file supplementary
materials.

1 In their reply brief, Defendants argued that because parties may raise this indispensable
2 party issue at any time, their delay cannot constitute “undue” delay and Plaintiffs would not be
3 prejudiced by the proposed amendment. (Reply at 2-3, 5.) However, at the hearing on
4 Defendants’ motion, Plaintiffs responded that pursuant to the *Ex Parte Young* doctrine, the State
5 may be sued for violations of federal law in which the plaintiffs merely seek prospective,
6 injunctive relief, and therefore, the State would be, at most, a necessary party to this action, but
7 would not be indispensable. Moreover, although the absence of an indispensable party may be
8 raised at any time, the failure to join necessary parties may be waived if objections are not made
9 in the defendant’s first responsive pleading. The Court provided Defendants an opportunity to
10 respond to Plaintiffs’ argument raised oral argument.

ANALYSIS

12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) (“Rule 15(a)”) permits a party to amend its
13 pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served. Once a
14 responsive pleading has been served, however, amendment requires written consent of the
15 adverse party or leave of the court. In accordance with the Federal Rule’s liberal pleading
16 standard, leave of the court “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
17 15(a). Though the decision to grant or deny a motion for leave to amend is governed by the
18 district court’s discretion, the general rule is that amendment of the pleadings is to be permitted
19 unless the opposing party makes a showing of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing
20 side, or futility of amendment. *See Forman v. Davis*, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); *DCD*
21 *Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton*, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1986).

22 As noted above, Plaintiffs countered Defendants' argument that because parties may
23 raise the indispensable party issue at any time, their delay could not constitute undue delay and
24 Plaintiffs would not be prejudiced by the proposed amendment. Plaintiffs asserted that pursuant
25 to the *Ex parte Young* doctrine, the State may be sued for violations of federal law in which the
26 plaintiffs merely seek prospective, injunctive relief, and therefore, the State would be, at most, a
27 necessary party to this action, but would not be indispensable. Moreover, although the absence
28 of an indispensable party may be raised at any time, the failure to join necessary parties may be

1 waived if objections are not made in the defendant's first responsive pleading. *See Citibank,*
2 *N.A. v. Oxford Properties & Finance Ltd.*, 688 F.2d 1259, 1263 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1982).

3 The Court finds Defendants' response to the issues of waiver and whether the State
4 would be indispensable unpersuasive. Defendants' reliance on *Phillippines v. Pimentel*, __ U.S.
5 __, 128 S.Ct. 2180 (2008) is misplaced. In *Phillippines*, the parties did not contest whether the
6 Republic of the Philippines ("Republic") and the Philippine Presidential Commission on Good
7 Governance ("Commission") were necessary parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8 19(a). *Id.* at 2189. The issue before the Court was whether the Republic and the Commission
9 were indispensable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 19(b).

10 Again, the Court finds Defendants' reliance on its cited authority for the proposition that
11 the State cannot be joined, and is thus indispensable pursuant to Rule 19(b), is misplaced.
12 Pursuant to the *Ex Parte Young* doctrine, the State may be sued for violations of federal law in
13 which the plaintiffs merely seek prospective, injunctive relief. *Ex parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123,
14 159-160 (1908). In the case relied on by Defendants, the Supreme Court held that although an
15 allegation of an on-going violation of federal law where the requested relief is prospective is
16 ordinarily sufficient to invoke the *Ex parte Young* doctrine, the case before it was "unusual in
17 that the Tribe's suit [was] the functional equivalent of a quiet title action" and sought
18 "substantially all benefits of ownership and control" over the property. *Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene*,
19 521 U.S. 261, 281-282 (1997). As a result, the Court held that the *Ex Parte Young* doctrine was
20 inapplicable. *Id.* In contrast, Plaintiffs' action here is not the equivalent of a quiet title action.
21 Therefore, *Coeur d'Alene* is inapposite.

22 Finally, Defendants unpersuasively argue that the issue of whether the State is a
23 necessary party cannot be waived. Defendants argue that the language of Rule 19(a) does not
24 impose any obligation on the parties to protect the interests of absent persons, but instead, is
25 directed at the courts. However, Defendants ignore the plain language of Federal Rule of Civil
26 Procedure 12 and the case law holding that the affirmative defense of failure to join necessary
27 parties may be waived if objections are not made in the first responsive pleading. Rule 12(b)
28 provides that every defense, including the failure to join a party under Rule 19, must be asserted

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1 in the responsive pleading if one is required. Rule 12(h)(2) merely exempts the failure to join a
 2 person required under Rule 19(b) from waiver, not necessary parties under Rule 19(a). *See Fed.*
 3 *R. Civ. P. 12(b), (h); see also Ransom v. Babbitt*, 69 F. Supp. 2d 141, 148 (D.D.C. 1999) (“The
 4 timeliness requirements of Rule 12(h) counsel that ‘[i]n federal procedure, failure to join
 5 necessary parties is waived if objection is not made in defendant’s first responsive pleading; it
 6 is only the absence of an indispensable party which may (possibly) be raised later.’”) (quoting
 7 *Citibank*, 688 F.2d at 1263 n. 4). Courts have clearly found that although the absence of an
 8 indispensable party may be raised at any time, the failure to join necessary parties may be
 9 waived if objections are not made in the defendant’s first responsive pleading. *See Citibank*,
 10 688 F.2d at 1263 n. 4;² *see also Manning v. Energy Conversion Devices, Inc.*, 13 F.3d 606, 609
 11 (2d Cir. 1994); *State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co.*, 518 F.2d
 12 292, 294 (10th Cir. 1975); *Church Mut. Ins. Co. v. Save-a-Buck Car Rental Co., Inc.*, 201
 13 F.R.D. 440, 440-441 (W.D. Mich. 2000); *Ransom*, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 148; *UTI Corp. v.*
 14 *Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co.*, 896 F. Supp. 389, 391 (D.N.J. 1995) (“the defense of failure to join
 15 necessary parties is waived if not pleaded”); *North Dixie Theatre, Inc. v. McCullion*, 613 F.
 16 Supp. 1339, 1346 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (“Although Rule 12(h)(2) preserves an *indispensable* party
 17 objection, this provision does not apply to persons who are merely necessary parties under Rule
 18 19(a)”) (emphasis in original).

19 The court in *CP National Corp. v. Bonneville Power Admin.*, 928 F.2d 905 (9th Cir.
 20 1991) simply provides that *courts* may raise the absence of necessary parties *sua sponte* and
 21 may do so at any stage in the proceeding. *Id.* at 911-12. The court did not consider whether a
 22 *party* could raise the issue at any stage in the proceeding or whether this defense could be
 23 waived, and did not address the requirements of Rule 12.

24 Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants have waived the issue of whether the State is
 25 a necessary party. The Court further finds that Defendants unduly delayed in raising this issue

27 ² Defendants argue that *Citibank* is inconsistent with *Philippines*, but, as noted above,
 28 in *Phillipines*, the parties did not contest whether the Republic and the Commission were
 necessary parties under Rule 19(a). Instead the issue before the Court was whether the
 Republic and the Commission were indispensable under Rule 19(b). *Phillippines*, 128 S.Ct.
 at 2189.

1 and that Plaintiffs would be prejudiced if Defendants were allowed to amend at this late stage in
2 the proceedings. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants' motion for leave to amend.

3 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

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5 Dated: June 1, 2009

Jeffrey S. White
6 JEFFREY S. WHITE
7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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